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Abstract 
Category-based induction is the willingness of a thinker to project some newly learned 
property of one or more classes of objects to another class, on the basis of their shared 
membership in a common superordinate category.  Previous research has established 
that the perceived strength of arguments of the form “Class A has property P, therefore 
class B has property P” is influenced by the similarity of A to B, and by the typicality or 
representativeness of A in a shared category, superordinate to both A and B.  (The 
nature of P is also crucial, but we do not examine it in this study).   There is however 
no prior evidence that the relation between B and the category is influential.  Three 
experiments were designed to test whether the typicality of B in the superordinate 
category also has an effect on inductive argument strength.  Using multiple regression 
(Experiment 1) and an experimental design (Experiment 3), an effect of conclusion 
typicality was found such that people are more willing to project properties to more 
typical conclusions.  Experiment 2 ruled out conclusion familiarity as a potential 
confounding variable.  The results are interpreted in the light of current models of 
category-based induction. 
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Category-based Induction  - an effect of conclusion typicality 
 
In a pioneering study, Rips (1975) posed problems of the following form to students: 
If all rabbits on a particular island have a new type of contagious disease, then 
what proportion of mice would be expected to have the disease? 
This type of argument has been termed inductive in that it is presumably through this 
form of reasoning that more general hypotheses are generated based on individual 
observations.  In particular, in contrast to deductive forms of reasoning such as 
syllogisms or conditionals, there is no clear way of determining what the correct answer 
in such a case may be.  It is therefore of great interest to determine the factors within 
such arguments that influence people when they come to make a judgment of 
argument strength.  This psychological question is, of course, largely independent of 
the equally interesting epistemological question of the grounds that would actually 
justify confidence in such an argument.    
Rips (1975) worked with biological categories such as Birds.  First, he took pair-
wise similarity judgments for a set of words from the same category, such as a sample 
of different bird names, together with the category name “bird” itself.  These similarity 
judgments were then scaled with multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to generate a two 
dimensional similarity space.  Effectively each concept name was placed on a two-
dimensional map, with the constraint that proximity on the map corresponded as 
closely as possible to mean rated similarity for any pair of concepts.  A second group of 
participants were given a set of arguments of the form cited above, each argument 
created by taking a different pair of concepts from the set of category members, and 
arranging them in a particular order.  This new group made judgments of the strength 
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of the inductive arguments.  The analysis then used a regression to try to predict rated 
strength of an argument in terms of relative positions of the two concepts in the 
similarity space.  For an argument of the form “If all A have a particular property, then 
what proportion of B will have it?”, A is the premise term, B the conclusion term, and let 
us call C the most specific superordinate category that contains both A and B, (but 
which is not mentioned explicitly in the argument).    In Rips’s study there were then 
three possible predictors of the argument strength (see Figure 1): 
- the distance of the premise A from the category C 
- the distance of the premise A from the conclusion B 
- the distance of the conclusion B from the category C. 
When these three variables were entered into the regression, Rips found that 
only the first two predictors were needed to account for variations in argument strength.  
The closer the premise was to the category (i.e. the more typical it was), and the closer 
the premise was to the conclusion (that is the more similar the premise and 
conclusion), then the stronger was the argument.   The typicality of the conclusion B 
(the proximity of B to C) was not a significant predictor of strength.   As a logical 
corollary of this result, Rips (1975) also showed that there is a premise-conclusion 
asymmetry effect in regard to typicality.  When one of the category members is more 
typical than the other, then the strength of the argument TYPICAL  ATYPICAL is 
stronger than the reverse argument.  This asymmetry follows automatically from the 
finding that premise typicality affects argument strength, while conclusion typicality 
does not, since clearly the argument pair TYPICAL  ATYPICAL will have a more 
typical premise than will the reversed pair ATYPICAL  TYPICAL.  (For the sake of 
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argument, it is assumed that similarity between the A and B terms is the same 
measured in each direction – as will necessarily be the case when taking proximity 
measures from MDS solutions.  Evidence for this assumption is provided by Aguilar 
and Medin, 1999). 
Subsequent work by Osherson et al. (1990) laid out evidence for a set of 
thirteen phenomena relating to category-based induction, using categories at different 
levels, and exploring arguments with either single or multiple premises.  One 
methodological advance on Rips (1975) was their introduction of an improved format 
for the task.  Asking about disease prevalence may bring to mind all kinds of different 
properties of the animals such as their diet and habitat which could influence the 
answer (see, for example, Coley et al. 1999).  In order to keep the logical structure of 
the argument free from any specific effects of stored knowledge or background theory, 
other than knowledge of the taxonomic hierarchy of creatures categories, Osherson et 
al. (1990) adopted the following format: 
Rabbits use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
therefore 
Mice use serotonin as a neurotransmitter 
Osherson et al. also tested for premise-conclusion asymmetry, but with 
equivocal results.  For example, when asked to choose directly between the two 
arguments BAT  MOUSE versus MOUSE  BAT, responses were evenly divided. 
(Mouse would be a typical mammal, and bat an atypical mammal).   Likewise, when 
rather than making a forced choice, participants gave ratings of the conditional 
probability of the conclusion given the premise, there was no significant asymmetry 
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effect.  The only condition where a reliable asymmetry effect was obtained was a 
condition where (a) the critical forced choice between the two arguments was placed in 
a context with other filler pairs, and (b) instructions were given that “there is always a 
difference in how much reason the facts of an argument give to believe its conclusion – 
however small this difference may be, we would like you to indicate for which argument 
the facts provide a better reason to believe the conclusion.”  Having noted this 
restriction on the generality of the asymmetry effect, one should also note that 
Osherson et al. (1990) do not state how many pairs of such arguments were tested per 
experiment, so their results (or lack of them) were quite possibly due to item-specific 
factors and a small sample size of items.  It appears then that the evidence for 
premise-conclusion asymmetry may be fairly weak.  This weakness could either reflect 
an absence of a premise typicality effect, or the presence of an equally strong 
conclusion typicality effect. 
The lack of an effect of conclusion typicality reported by Rips (1975) has been 
further confirmed in several developmental studies, some of which also used adult 
groups as controls (Carey, 1985; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988).  In an extensive review of 
the literature, Heit (2000) concluded “there have been no reports to date of 
independent effects of the typicality of the conclusion category as opposed to the 
premise category”.  Perhaps the only result that suggests that there may be such an 
effect comes from a study by Sloman (1998) which took a category name as the 
premise of the argument.  Arguments of the form PLANTS  MOSSES should be 
perfectly convincing, provided that the participant agrees with the premise (such as all 
plants have bryophytes), and agrees that all mosses are indeed plants.  However 
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Sloman showed that people still felt more confident in arguments that led to more 
typical conclusions – for example preferring PLANTS  FLOWERS to PLANTS  
MOSSES.  Sloman’s result therefore sits rather uneasily with the apparent lack of a 
conclusion typicality effect when the premise is a category member rather than a 
category name.  We therefore decided to investigate the issue of conclusion typicality 
further. 
The aim of the current research was to set up an experimental test of the 
existence of a conclusion typicality effect.  To this end, we considered carefully the 
best way in which to select materials for the test.  It was not sufficient simply to select a 
premise and then two conclusions of differing typicality, all from the same category, 
since if typical items have a tendency to be more similar to one another than do typical 
to atypical items, an effect of conclusion typicality could simply reflect a difference in 
premise-conclusion similarity. 
Sets of category members were therefore needed that were well balanced for 
premise typicality and premise-conclusion similarity but would vary maximally on 
conclusion typicality.  One of the problems with earlier research is that if the premise 
concept is a typical member of the category, it follows that there will be a close 
correspondence between premise-conclusion similarity and conclusion typicality.  As 
the points A and C in Figure 1 draw closer together, so the lengths of AB and CB are 
more and more constrained to be very similar.  Given that premise-conclusion similarity 
(AB) is known to have the strongest effect on inductive argument strength, it is unlikely 
that there would be an independently detectable effect of conclusion typicality simply 
because of the multi-collinearity arising from using a very typical premise.  Accordingly 
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we chose premises of intermediate typicality, which would enable us to choose 
conclusions of varied typicality but matched similarity to the premise. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment adopted Rips’ (1975) regression method.  Independent 
measures were obtained of premise typicality, conclusion typicality, premise-conclusion 
similarity and the inductive strength of the argument from premise to conclusion.  
Inductive strength was then regressed on the other three variables.  
Method 
Participants.  Forty-eight students at City University, London participated on a 
voluntary basis to provide the initial set of normative ratings, 25 for typicality and 23 for 
pair-wise similarities.  An additional 19 students volunteered to provide a second set of 
similarity ratings for new pairings of the original items.  The final balanced set of 
materials were then given to a third group of 36 students who rated the inductive 
strength of the premise-conclusion arguments, participating in return for course credit.  
There was no overlap between any of the groups. 
Materials.  Materials were generated in triplets within three biological categories 
– birds, mammals and insects.  Pre-testing involved first obtaining ratings of typicality 
for a larger set of items in their respective categories, and obtaining similarity ratings 
for paired premise and conclusion concepts in each category.  Order within the list was 
randomized within categories, except that for similarity ratings, pairs with the same 
premise (e.g. horse-cow and horse-bison) were kept maximally apart in the list.  Order 
of premise and conclusion concepts within a pair was counter-balanced across 
materials.  Each category was presented on a separate page of a three page booklet, 
and page order was balanced across participants for both tasks. 
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Analysis of the first set of ratings revealed that the initial construction of triplets 
had not succeeded in balancing the similarity of premise-conclusion pairs within each 
triplet.  The same items were therefore re-paired into new triplets, and a second set of 
similarity ratings were obtained.  It was then possible to construct a total of 22 triplets, 
8 for mammals and 7 each for birds and insects. 
Procedure.  For the ratings of typicality and similarity, subjects were tested in a 
classroom setting, and completed the booklets in their own time without conferring.  
The typicality booklet contained 3 pages, one for each category, and used a 1-7 
numbered scale, with 1 meaning very typical and 7 very atypical.  Instructions 
emphasized the difference between familiarity and typicality (see Hampton and 
Gardiner, 1983).  Similarity ratings were also blocked within category, in order to 
ensure that the basis used for similarity was relevant to the task.  The category name 
was printed at the top of the page for both tasks.  Similarity instructions asked 
participants to “rate each pair according to how similar or dissimilar the two instances 
appear to you within the category to which the pair belongs”.  A 1-7 numbered scale 
was again used, with 1 representing a very similar pair, and 7 a very dissimilar pair.  In 
both tasks, if a participant did not know any of the items, they were instructed to 
underline the item and leave the scale blank.  Seventeen participants (25%) were 
excluded from the analysis because they either marked more than 20% of items as 
unknown, or they failed to engage with the task (for example marking every item as 
very typical).   
From an initial set of 30 a final set of 22 triplets were selected after re-pairing 
and re-measuring similarities.  Within each triplet of premise A, typical conclusion Btyp 
and atypical conclusion Batyp, the similarity of A to each conclusion was matched, and 
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the conclusions differed maximally in their typicality in the category.  All items in the 
final set were known to at least 75% of participants.  (Some degree of unfamiliarity for 
the atypical items was necessary in order to generate triplets that were otherwise 
matched on similarity.  Experiment 2 returns to the question of whether familiarity may 
be confounding the effects of typicality.)  A list of the triplets used, together with their 
mean ratings is shown in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Finally the 22 triplets were used to construct 44 inductive arguments, taking the 
premise with either of the two conclusion terms.  As in Osherson et al. (1990) 44 
different biologically plausible blank predicates were used such as “needs Vitamin K for 
liver function”.  Each argument was quantified with the word “All” in order to stress that 
the premise and conclusion applied to whole kinds rather than to individuals.  One 
argument from each triplet was arranged in a random order in one booklet, while the 
other was placed in a second booklet.  Order was random, but blocked by category.  
Each booklet contained equal numbers of typical and atypical arguments.  For each 
category two additional filler items were included in the first and sixth positions in the 
list, in order to disguise the design.  Two additional booklets were constructed by 
reversing the order of arguments within each category list (while keeping the filler items 
in the same place).  Order of the three categories in the booklets was also 
counterbalanced across participants.  The booklets were distributed to students in a 
classroom setting and were completed without time constraint or conferring.  
Instructions were to consider the first statement as being a true fact, and then to judge 
the probability of the conclusion being true in the light of the evidence provided by the 
fact.  Ratings were made on a 10 point scale, with 1 representing no faith in the 
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argument being true (very unlikely), and 10 representing strong belief that the 
argument could be true (very likely).  As previously, participants were told to underline 
any items they did not know, and to leave the scale blank.   
Results 
Reliability of ratings.  Across the 22 triplets, mean rated similarity for Premise-
Typical conclusion and for Premise-Atypical conclusion pairs was identical at 4.43 (sd 
= .89 and 1.04 respectively). The average standard error for individual item pair 
similarity ratings was 0.37.  Mean rated typicality was 2.30 (sd = .44) for the premise 
items, 1.72 (sd = .36) for the typical conclusion items, and 3.41 (sd = .61) for the 
atypical conclusion items.  Across all premises the variance in typicality was 0.19, 
whereas across all conclusions the variance in typicality was 0.98.  There was 
therefore 5 times as much variance in the conclusion typicalities as in the premise 
typicalities.  As had been intended, the materials maximized the manipulation of 
conclusion typicality.  A consequence of this procedure however was to produce 
greatly truncated variance in premise typicality.  Reliability of the premise-conclusion 
similarity judgments across the 44 arguments was .84 (Spearman-Brown).  Across the 
66 typicality judgments, reliability was 0.86.  This broke down into .89 for the 44 
conclusion typicalities but only .52 for the 22 premise typicalities (because of the 
truncated variance.) 
Mean inductive strength was calculated for each of the 44 arguments, and is 
shown in Table 1.  Thirty-eight data points (less than 5%) were treated as missing 
because of unfamiliarity or failure to complete a rating.  No participants or triplets 
needed to be omitted because of undue levels of missing data.  Corrected split-half 
reliability for inductive strength was 0.82. 
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Regression analysis.  All 44 arguments were entered into a multiple regression 
analysis to predict mean rated argument strength on the basis of the three predictors: 
premise-conclusion similarity, premise typicality and conclusion typicality.  (Because of 
the direction of scoring of the scales, all predictors were expected to enter with 
negative coefficients.)  As expected the regression showed a strong effect of premise-
conclusion similarity (beta = -.733, p<.001).  There was no reliable premise typicality 
effect (beta = .112, p>.10), probably because of the deliberately reduced variance and 
consequently low reliability for this measure.  There was however a significant effect of 
conclusion typicality (beta = -.246, p = .029).  Adjusted R square was .50.  When 
dummy variables were included to take account of the factor of Category, the 
conclusion typicality effect was somewhat smaller, but remained significant (beta = 
.195, p =.047).  Further tests showed that after entering premise-conclusion similarity 
as a first step, conclusion typicality would enter next with a significant beta (p = .035), 
whereas premise typicality would not (p = .46). 
Lorch and Myers (1990) suggested that a more valid way to analyze regression 
data when using items as the random variable is to perform separate regression 
analyses on each individual participant, and then to combine the results.  The set of 
ratings given by each of the 18 participants who rated inductive strength were taken 
individually, and 18 regression analyses were run to predict their individual ratings on 
the basis of the three predictors.  Mean multiple R was 0.40, and mean R square was 
0.18.   The results confirmed the strong effect of premise-conclusion similarity (mean 
beta = -0.34, one sample t(17) = -8.00, p < .001), and the significant effect of 
conclusion typicality (mean beta = -0.12, one sample t(17) = -3.27, p < .005.)  As 
before there was no significant effect of premise typicality.  The beta coefficient was in 
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the predicted direction for 17 out of 18 participants for the similarity effect and for 14 
out of 18 participants for the typicality conclusion effect, 5 of which were individually 
significant at .05, 1-tailed. 
Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to select a set of materials in such a way as to 
optimize the chances of obtaining an effect of conclusion typicality on the judged 
strength of a simple inductive argument.  The normal correlation between premise-
conclusion similarity and conclusion typicality was prevented from confounding the test 
of the hypothesis by deliberately choosing premises of intermediate typicality.  With this 
correlation held artificially low (r = -.07, p >.5), variations in conclusion typicality were 
indeed found to predict inductive strength.  More specifically, the higher the typicality of 
the conclusion concept in an inductive argument, the more strongly was the argument 
rated.   
Experiment 2 
One issue that remains a potential problem for interpreting the results of 
Experiment 1 concerns the differences in familiarity of the typical and atypical materials 
within the triplets.  In order to construct well balanced triplets, it proved necessary to 
allow atypical conclusion concepts to be prima facie less familiar than typical 
conclusion concepts.  Not all atypical items were unfamiliar – for example rat, and 
squirrel are probably more familiar than hyena or grizzly bear to a British sample.  
However should it turn out that familiarity of conclusion concepts predicts the strength 
of an inductive inference, our interpretation of the conclusion typicality effect is at risk.  
Indeed, some unpublished data from Collister and B.Tversky (personal communication) 
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suggests that people may prefer arguments with less familiar premises and more 
familiar conclusion terms. 
In Experiment 2, therefore, a further sample of students from the same 
population were asked to provide ratings of familiarity for all 66 concepts used in 
Experiment 1.  Mean familiarity ratings were calculated and correlated with the 
predictors and dependent variable from that Experiment. 
Method. 
Participants.  18 students at City University, London participated for course 
credit.  None took part in any of the other experiments. 
Procedure.  Booklets were created in which the concepts from the triplets were 
listed in alphabetic order, blocked by category.  A five point scale was provided, and 
participants rated the familiarity of each concept from 1 = very unfamiliar to 5 = very 
familiar. 
Results 
Mean familiarity ratings were calculated for each of the 66 concepts.  Split half 
reliability was estimated at 0.92.   Mean familiarity across concepts ranged from 4.6 
and above for highly familiar concepts such as dog, duck and ant, down to 1.9 for the 
less familiar bison.  Mean familiarity was 3.8 (sd = 0.6) for the premises, 4.0 (sd = 0.5) 
for the typical conclusion concepts, and 3.2 (sd = 0.7) for the atypical conclusions.  
Within the triplets, 16 of the 22 had a more familiar typical than atypical conclusion 
term.  However when compared to the results of Experiment 1, familiarity had no 
correlation with inductive strength of arguments.   Familiarity of the premise term 
correlated with inductive strength with r = 0.03, and familiarity of the conclusion term 
correlated with strength with r of  -.07.   Furthermore, the familiarity variables failed to 
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enter any of the regression models examined in Experiment 1 with significant 
coefficients.  
There was therefore no evidence that the observed significant effect of 
conclusion typicality was owing to differences in familiarity. 
Experiment 3 
To provide a further test of generality for the conclusion typicality effect, 
Experiment 3 adopted a quasi-experimental design, so that generalization across both 
items and subjects could be tested.  Instead of making ratings of strength for individual 
arguments, a forced-choice procedure was used in which a pair of arguments were 
presented, and participants were asked to select the stronger.  Osherson et al (1990) 
used a similar procedure.  The forced-choice procedure helps to focus attention on the 
key factor of the conclusion item, since pairs of arguments had the same premise and 
the same predicate but differed in their conclusions. 
Method. 
Participants.   Forty-eight students at City University London volunteered to 
participate, either with no incentive or for course credit.  None of the participants had 
taken part in any of the earlier experiments. 
Materials.  The same set of 22 triplets were used as in Experiment 1.  They 
were organized into pairs with a common premise and two different conclusions, one 
typical and one atypical.  The same filler items were used within each category list to 
disguise the manipulation of conclusion typicality. 
Procedure.  Booklets contained 28 argument pairs, comprising the 22 critical 
test pairs blocked by category, and the 6 filler pairs.  Participants completed the 
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booklets in a group setting, without time constraint.  An example of an argument pair 
was as follows: 
a) All Vultures have sesamoid bones, therefore all Robins have sesamoid bones 
b) All Vultures have sesamoid bones, therefore all Ostriches have sesamoid 
bones 
One argument was presented on the left of the page, and the other argument 
opposite it on the right of the page.  Across booklets, typical and atypical arguments 
occurred equally often on the left or the right.  Participants had to indicate which of the 
two they considered a stronger argument - which they felt was more likely to be true.  
Order of critical pairs was randomized within categories, with the filler arguments in 
positions 1 and 6.  A second set of booklets used the reverse random order for critical 
pairs.  Order of categories within the booklets was also counterbalanced, leading to 12 
different booklets.  Four participants completed each booklet.  As before if a concept 
was unknown, participants were asked to underline it and move on to the next pair. 
Results.  Less than 6% of the data were omitted because of unknown items, and 
the data from all participants were used.  The argument with the more typical 
conclusion was selected 58% of the time, where chance would be 50%.  This result 
was significant across subjects, t(47) = 3.89, p<.001, two-tailed.  Thirty-four out of 48 
participants showed the effect.  Similar t-tests were significant for each of the three 
categories individually, with p values between .05 and .003.   Across items, 17 out of 
22 paired arguments had a greater proportion of participants selecting the more typical 
conclusion, (p<.01 on a sign test).  This result was also significant on a one-sample t-
test across items (t(21) = 2.37, p < .027, two-tailed).   There was no significant 
correlation between the proportion of participants choosing the more typical conclusion 
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for an item, and the difference in the rated familiarity from Experiment 2 of the two 
conclusions (r = 0.1).   There was therefore again no evidence that familiarity plays a 
role in judging inductive strength. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 confirmed the finding from Experiment 1 that the typicality of a 
conclusion concept can affect the perceived strength of an inductive argument.  When 
given a choice between two arguments, one with a typical conclusion and one with an 
atypical conclusion (with respect to the common superordinate category), participants 
showed a significant tendency to prefer the typical one.  The effect was relatively small 
(as in Experiment 1) but was consistent, with 71% of participants and 77% of items 
showing the predicted pattern. 
General Discussion 
The results presented here provide a clear demonstration of a robust effect of 
the typicality of the conclusion term in category-based inductions.  Before discussing 
our own account of the data, we next discount three alternative accounts of the data, 
and consider its implications for Sloman’s (1993) and Osherson et al.’s (1990) models. 
Choice of appropriate superordinate 
If Osherson et al’s model is correct, it could account for our data by supposing 
that premises and typical conclusions were members of more narrowly defined 
superordinates than the corresponding premises and atypical conclusions.  For 
example [duck + canary] may cue retrieval of Flying Birds, whereas [duck + ostrich] 
would cue retrieval of Birds.  Similarly [horse + cow] might cue Farm Animal, whereas 
[horse + bison] would cue just Animal.  The more narrowly defined the superordinate 
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category, then the more likely it is that the premise term will provide fuller coverage of 
the category – and hence the stronger will be the argument. 
Basis of similarity 
A related notion would be that the use of the biological blank predicate (e.g. 
uses serotonin as a neurotransmitter), could have triggered a different similarity metric 
from that considered when people just rated similarity alone (see Heit and Rubinstein, 
1994).  For example about half of the triples have an atypical conclusion term that 
comes from a different geographical region from the other two terms (e.g. Eagle – 
Crow – Cockatoo).  Perhaps people might have used geographical region as an 
indicator of deeper biological similarity for the inductive judgment, but ignored it when 
making general similarity judgments in the pretest. 
While these are both plausible explanations, there was no support for them in 
the data. To illustrate this claim, Table 1 lists the triples within each category in 
descending order of their effect size (argument strength for typical conclusion minus 
argument strength for atypical conclusion) in Experiment 1.  The strongest effects of 
conclusion typicality in Experiment 1 were in triples where neither of these accounts 
apply (e.g. Centipede – Beetle – Silverfish,  Koala – Tiger – Guinea pig).  In addition 
the triple that went most strongly against the hypothesis was one to which both 
arguments do apply (Duck – Canary – Ostrich).  Ostrich is from a different evolutionary 
niche and is not in the Flying Bird category, but (contrary to the overall trend) the 
argument  from Duck to Ostrich was rated as stronger than from Duck to Canary.  
When coded as binary variables (using the first author’s intuitions), neither of these 
hypotheses entered into the regressions for Experiment 1 with significant coefficients, 
whereas the effect of Conclusion typicality remained strong and significant.  Of course, 
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a fully adequate test of these accounts would require further work, predicting argument 
strength from two new data sets.  One would be data on the closest common 
superordinate that people associate with a pair of items, and the other would be 
similarity judgments taken from a biological perspective. 
Non-specific effects of typicality 
Our results depend critically on the preference of participants for arguments that 
have more typical conclusion terms.   An interesting third possibility is that there may 
be some overall non-specific bias towards accepting the truth of statements about 
typical concepts – regardless of any other considerations.  The test for this would be to 
obtain estimates of the truth of the argument conclusions in the absence of the 
premises.  It is implausible to expect such a bias, given that it would be reflecting 
typicality in relation to a category which is not mentioned in the task.  Furthermore, if 
there were a bias, it would more plausibly relate to familiarity, and work the other way.  
The more ignorant we are of an item, then perhaps the more willing we are to accept 
that any given predicate should be true of it.   We therefore consider this account 
unlikely.   
Given the demonstration that the typicality of the conclusion concept may affect 
inductive strength, our discussion now turns to how two particular current models may 
or may not be able to accommodate such an effect.   
Sloman’s feature-based model 
The first model to be considered was proposed by Sloman (1993).  In his 
feature-based model, when premises are introduced, the features possessed by those 
premise concepts are associated to the predicate.  The strength of the argument 
associating the predicate to the conclusion is then determined by the feature overlap 
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between the conclusion term and the set of activated features, divided by a measure of 
the “magnitude” of the conclusion term.  More specifically, argument strength will 
increase with premise-conclusion similarity, but will decrease the more features are 
possessed by the conclusion term.    Sloman’s model is entirely feature based, and 
requires no consideration of set inclusion relations.  It is therefore well suited to the 
approach proposed above.  More radically, however, it does not require activation of 
any superordinate category in the case of single premise arguments such as those 
considered in this paper.  All typicality effects are handled either by feature overlap, or 
by the degree of richness of the conclusion concept term.  For example to account for 
the possible asymmetry between TYPICALATYPICAL and ATYPICALTYPICAL 
arguments it is proposed that more typical conclusions will tend to have richer feature 
representations, and hence will have weaker argument strengths.  Sloman (1993) 
discussed evidence based on six pairs of items for which typicality and richness of 
representation could be disconfounded.  He concluded that the number of features 
possessed by the conclusion term is the critical factor in making weaker arguments, 
(see also Sloman and Wisnieski, 1992).  
If this were the correct account of the asymmetry effect, and if typical concepts 
are distinguished by having richer feature representations, then holding the premise 
constant (as was done here) and varying typicality of the conclusion should show an 
inverse conclusion typicality effect; more typical conclusions should show weaker 
strength ratings, to the extent that they have richer feature representations.  To explain 
the advantage for arguments with typical conclusions, Sloman would have to argue (in 
contradiction to his account of the asymmetry effect) that the typical conclusion items 
Hampton         Category-Based Induction 
 21
used in these studies have less rich feature representations.  The reader can check the 
plausibility of this idea in Table 1, where the triples are listed in descending order of 
effect size.  To take the two triples with the strongest effect, it would imply that beetle 
has a less rich representation than silverfish, and that tiger has fewer features 
represented than guinea pig. 
Note also that Experiment 2 failed to show any effects of familiarity of the 
premise and conclusion concepts on inductive argument strength, whereas one might 
reasonably expect concepts with richer feature representations to be judged as more 
familiar. 
Osherson et al. 
The second model is Osherson et al.’s 1990 coverage model which suggests 
that inductive strength in single premise arguments is determined by two things: the 
similarity between premise and conclusion terms, and the average similarity between 
the premise and other members of the lowest superordinate category that includes 
both premise and conclusion.  Their model therefore predicts that if premise typicality 
and premise-conclusion similarity are held constant there will be no conclusion 
typicality effect.  Although their model is clearly successful at accounting for a wide 
range of phenomena, nonetheless our data suggest that it is in need of modification. 
We suggest, like Osherson et al, that there are two “routes” to argument 
strength: one direct route through the similarity between the mental representations of 
the premise and conclusion concepts, and a second indirect route via category 
membership.  The first route, via similarity, is presumably a very general route, 
applying to any pair of items regardless of their category membership.  It is the second 
route involving membership in the common superordinate category that needs revision.  
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The indirect route involves two stages, both probably driven by a belief that members 
of biological categories share hidden biological properties.  One simple modification of 
the Osherson et al. model would propose that when the superordinate category 
becomes implicated in the reasoning process, it is a prototype of the superordinate that 
is involved rather than the superordinate category considered as an equivalence set.  
Osherson et al.’s model proposes that once the premise or premises have activated 
the superordinate, then the resulting argument strength applies equally to all category 
members.  The reasoning according to their model might thus be explicated as 
involving the following 2 stages: 
1. All vultures have sesamoid bones, therefore all birds have sesamoid bones, 
2. All birds have sesamoid bones, all ostriches are birds, therefore all ostriches 
have sesamoid bones, 
The first step in the reasoning will have variable strength depending on premise 
typicality, but the second step is taken in their model to be always perfectly strong on 
logical grounds.  (Step 2 has the classical form of a syllogism).  There is evidence 
however from Sloman (1998) that people do not always respect the logic of step 2  
(see also Hampton (1982) for failures in the transitivity of category superordination).  
As described in the introduction, Sloman showed that people still preferred arguments 
from a superordinate to a typical subset over arguments from the same superordinate 
to an atypical subset.  
According to the proposed modification to the model, the reasoning would now 
proceed as follows: 
1. All vultures have sesamoid bones, therefore prototypical birds have sesamoid 
bones, 
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2. Prototypical birds have sesamoid bones, therefore all ostriches have sesamoid 
bones. 
Unlike the Osherson et al model, the middle term of the category-based 
induction in our model is the prototype for the category, and not the category as a 
whole class.  The category is being represented as an intensional concept, and not as 
an extensional set of exemplars.   (See Tversky and Kahneman (1982) and Hampton 
(1987) for additional evidence that through representing concepts in terms of their 
properties people are prone to ignore logical constraints on set membership.)  By using 
intensional representation, the quantification of the middle argument “birds have 
sesamoid bones” is left vague, and so step 2 cannot be given maximum strength on 
logical grounds. 
Step 1 is of variable strength and will depend as before on premise typicality.  
Step 2 however will also be of variable strength and will now depend on the conclusion 
typicality.  Moreover these two steps rely on the same general principle as the direct 
route for assessing argument strength, namely the similarity between two concepts. 
Osherson et al.’s model applies to a much wider range of inductive problems 
than those considered here.  One phenomenon that would not be explained by a 
simple activation account like that offered here is the diversity effect.  Arguments using 
two premise terms from the same category as the conclusion are considered less 
strong if the two premise terms are similar than if they are diverse.  Activation of the 
prototype concept for the superordinate according to our proposal would therefore 
have to be greater in the case of diverse premises.  Possible mechanisms to achieve 
this would to base prototype activation on a sum of similarity to category exemplars (as 
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in Osherson et al.’s model), or alternatively to base prototype activation on a measure 
of feature overlap between the disjunction of the features of the two premises and the 
prototype as in Sloman’s (1993) model. 
Asymmetry 
As it stands, the proposed modification to the Osherson two-route model would 
predict that the final strength of the argument due to the indirect route would be the 
product of the strengths of the two links.  However that would imply symmetry in the 
strength of arguments when the premise and conclusion terms are reversed.  Some 
alternative account therefore remains to be given of the premise-conclusion asymmetry 
effect, assuming it to be reliable.  One can look for an answer in two places – in the 
direct route and in the indirect route, either or both of which may introduce asymmetry. 
Asymmetry in the direct route would arise if the underlying similarity between the 
concepts is itself asymmetric.  There is evidence that similarity is greater for a pair of 
items when the more typical or salient term is the target.  For example, Tversky (1977) 
reported that the similarity (as rated by US students) of Cuba to the USA is rated as 
greater than the similarity of the USA to Cuba.  If premise-conclusion similarity were 
asymmetrical in a similar way, (and computed as the similarity of the conclusion term to 
the premise term), then that could account for the effect of reversing premise and 
conclusion within an argument.  However, as noted in the introduction, Aguilar and 
Medin (1999) reported a failure to replicate asymmetries in similarity ratings. 
A second locus for asymmetry would be in the indirect route.  Note that to be 
consistent with asymmetry, our result implies that there must be both a premise and a 
conclusion typicality effect, but that the premise typicality effect be greater than the 
conclusion typicality effect.  One way to achieve this would be for the generalization 
Hampton         Category-Based Induction 
 25
gradient around a category prototype such as bird to be broader than that around a 
subclass concept such as robin or ostrich.  Having narrow generalization gradients, 
individual concepts will only activate the general category name if they are close to it.  
Typical premises such as robin will activate bird strongly, but atypical premises will not.  
The effect of premise typicality is therefore very pronounced.  Once activated, the 
category name generalizes more broadly across all members of the category.  
Although it will still activate typical conclusions more strongly than atypical conclusions, 
the gradient of the typicality effect will be much shallower. 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out first to demonstrate the existence of a phenomenon 
previously claimed not to exist – namely that the typicality of a conclusion category 
affects the judgement of strength in category-based induction.  The phenomenon was 
demonstrated with two different procedures across three biological categories, and an 
explanation in terms of familiarity was discounted.  Finally, the implications of the result 
were discussed.  First they appear to directly contradict the account given by Sloman’s 
(1993) feature-based model for typicality effects, since (unless typical items should turn 
out to have fewer features) the explanation he provides for the typicality asymmetry 
effect predicts that less typical conclusions will have stronger argument strength.  
Second, a modification of the Osherson et al. (1990) model was proposed in which the 
strength of an argument is propagated via the superordinate category, but through 
activation of the category prototype rather than the set of category members.   
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Table 1.  Triplets used in both experiments, together with mean ratings for premise typicality, similarity between the premise and each conclusion, 
and typicality and familiarity (from Experiment 2) for the conclusion items.  Also shown is argument strength (Experiment 1). 
Category = Mammals 
Premise Mean 
Premise 
Typicality 
Mean 
Premise 
Familiarity 
Typical Conclusion / 
Atypical Conclusion 
Mean P-C 
Similarity 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Typicality 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Familiarity 
Mean 
Argument 
Strength 
Koala 2.44 3.39 Tiger  
Guinea Pig 
5.71 
5.47 
1.81 
3.13 
4.28 
4.28 
4.28 
2.78 
Dog 1.25 4.89 Fox  
Coyote 
2.53 
2.00 
1.81 
3.87 
4.61 
2.78 
6.00 
4.83 
Whale 2.56 4.00 Grizzly Bear  
Bat 
6.06 
6.31 
2.19 
3.56 
3.56 
3.94 
3.78 
2.78 
Horse 1.75 
 
4.72 Cow 
Bison 
3.76 
3.88 
1.44 
2.69 
4.67 
1.89 
5.89 
5.25 
Boar 2.80 2.67 Deer  
Walrus 
4.71 
5.47 
1.81 
3.71 
4.06 
2.83 
4.72 
4.64 
Zebra 2.31 3.89 Hippopotamus 
Squirrel 
5.59 
5.71 
2.13 
2.94 
3.78 
4.50 
3.28 
3.28 
Hare 2.56 3.56 Goat  
Rat 
5.00 
4.35 
1.81 
3.06 
4.39 
4.50 
3.39 
4.06 
Wolf 2.13 3.83 Hyena  
Dingo 
3.00 
2.65 
2.63 
4.00 
3.67 
2.33 
5.89 
6.56 
 
Hampton         Category-Based Induction 
 30
Table 1 (continued) 
Category = Birds 
Premise Mean 
Premise 
Typicality 
Mean 
Premise 
Familiarity 
Typical Conclusion 
Atypical Conclusion 
Mean P-C 
Similarity 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Typicality 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Familiarity 
Mean 
Argument 
Strength 
Vulture 2.40 3.11 Sparrow 
Quail 
4.94 
4.69 
1.06 
3.54 
4.28 
2.72 
6.06 
4.62 
Pelican 3.00 
 
3.50 Parrot 
Toucan 
3.18 
3.13 
1.38 
3.42 
4.17 
2.56 
6.47 
5.19 
Heron 2.31 2.94 Pheasant 
Emu 
4.50 
4.07 
2.19 
4.14 
3.61 
3.06 
5.07 
4.56 
Eagle 1.31 3.94 Crow  
Cockatoo 
3.82 
5.00 
1.19 
2.38 
4.17 
3.33 
5.28 
4.89 
Stork 2.93 3.33 Falcon  
Goose 
3.44 
3.19 
1.94 
3.00 
3.06 
3.94 
6.12 
6.28 
Chicken 2.38 4.61 Magpie 
Flamingo 
4.81 
4.82 
1.57 
3.00 
3.61 
3.72 
5.17 
5.67 
Duck 2.00 4.56 Canary 
Ostrich 
4.50 
4.12 
1.44 
3.33 
3.61 
3.50 
4.89 
6.83 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Category = Insects 
Premise Mean 
Premise 
Typicality 
Mean 
Premise 
Familiarity 
Typical Conclusion 
Atypical Conclusion 
Mean P-C 
Similarity 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Typicality 
Mean 
Conclusion 
Familiarity 
Mean 
Argument 
Strength 
Centipede 2.47 
 
3.61 Beetle 
Silverfish 
4.35 
4.57 
1.73 
5.08 
4.33 
2.94 
5.81 
3.88 
Butterfly 2.69 4.50 Ant  
Tick 
5.35 
5.50 
1.44 
3.29 
4.94 
2.89 
4.22 
3.35 
Daddy-long- 
   legs 
2.19 4.06 Cockroach 
Praying Mantis 
4.41 
3.85 
1.63 
4.33 
4.06 
2.11 
4.56 
4.00 
Dragonfly 2.38 3.72 Flea 
Maggot 
4.53 
5.06 
1.94 
3.53 
3.39 
3.28 
3.83 
3.56 
Ladybird 2.13 4.28 Spider 
Termite 
4.65 
4.44 
1.50 
2.88 
4.78 
3.00 
3.94 
4.06 
Wasp 2.06 4.39 Cricket 
Scorpion 
4.71 
4.94 
1.75 
3.19 
3.67 
3.50 
3.81 
4.11 
Locust 2.53 3.06 Mosquito 
Earwig 
3.94 
4.23 
1.50 
3.00 
4.11 
2.94 
4.39 
5.14 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1 
Representation of a category prototype C, with a typical instance A and an 
atypical instance B.  As the distance AC gets shorter, so the correlation between 
AB and BC, as B takes different positions, becomes higher.  AB represents 
premise-conclusion similarity, whereas AC and BC represent the premise and 
conclusion typicalities respectively. 
